It is almost an indictment of the Health Service to realize that DHSS departmental records show that 83 patients died as a result of fires in hospitals over a period of five years.
Other serious fires necessitated total evacuation. In one instance 72 bed patients and 36 doctors and other staff narrowly avoided disaster. The circumstances of this fire trapped 16 theatre staff and two patients undergoing operations. It is of paramount importance that medical staff' should -have contingency plans for the evacuation of surgical patients from theatres and know of the hazards involved.
Dr J V Farman (Addenbrooke's Hospital, Hills Road, Cambridge, CB2 2QQ)
The hazards of fire are enormously increased in the case of hospital patients, most of whom are incapable of caring for themselves. This applies particularly to patients in operating theatres, recovery rooms and intensive care units, who depend for their lives on artificial respiretion, oxygen, intravenous drips and on the constant attendance of medical and nursing staff. Fire may cause direct damage and this is what we, usually think of when we consider the risk of fire. We do not consider the risk of being stranded, possibly at night in the dark with electricity and piped gases cut off. We do not think of the danger of poisonous smoke enveloping us, nor of the problems of evacuating our patients and staff.
The first principle of fire protection is evacuation of the areas likely to be affected. Obviously adequate escape routes are essential, although these are by no means always provided. The hospital in which I work has a suite of eight theatres on the first floor. It was opened just under three years ago, so is one of the most modern in the country. The main theatre entrance is off a corridor which also leads to the staff entrance. There are two narrow spiral staircases leading to the floor above, quite unsuitable for patients. There are two lifts which allow downward movement, but we are not allowed to use lifts in the event of fire, for obvious reasons of safety. We are therefore left with the external fire escape shown in Fig 1. The theatre. exit is the lowest of the three doors. It is of an awkward shape, exposed to gale force winds and subzero temperatures and it leads to a sort of moat at the bottom. At many times during the day there are around 100 people in the theatres: 15 patients, 15 theatre nurses, 8 recovery nurses, 10 anesthetists, 15 surgeons, 10 students, 7 operating department assistants, 13 sterilizing unit staff, 10 others (radiographers, measurement technicians and so on).
All these people would be expected to escape down the stairs. The majority will obviously be able to save themselves. The problems arise when we consider evacuation of the patients. Immediate decisions must be made about them. I would like to consider these decisions under five headings: (1) Patients who are premedicated, severely ill or recovering from anaesthesia are not capable of moving themselves. At least two people are needed to move such a patient by moving the bed or trolley or preferably by using an escape harness such as the Anglia patient evacuator.
(2) A patient receives oxygen either prophylactically (for example, during recovery) or because it is known to be life-sustaining. During evacuation the latter only should continue to receive it, from a portable cylinder which can lie on the mattress alongside the patient.
(3) Patients on drips can similarly be divided into these who are receiving a normal fluid intake, in which case the drip can be clamped off and laid alongside the patient, and those in whom the drip is life-sustaining. In the latter case an extra person is needed to carry the bottle. The same applies to chest drains and bladder washout bottles.
(4) Patients receiving artificial respiration should be transferred to self-inflating bags for evacuation. These should be operated by doctors or senior nurses with experience of the procedure (Fig 2) . Portable oxygen cylinders will also be needed for these patients.
(5) In the case of patients actually undergoing operations, the decision has to be made whether the operation can be terminated. Clearly in a great many operations temporary closure of the wound would be possible, with little likelihood of harm, while in others (such as open-heart, arterial and neurosurgical operations) it would be impossible. However, it may be possible to transfer such a case to another theatre remote from the fire danger. The most difficult point of decision will occur when the route of evacuation or escape is about to be cut off. All cases which can be interrupted should be terminated and evacuated while the opportunity remains. Whatever happens the patient should be accompanied by the anesthetist and the surgeon until safe conditions are once more reached. This also applies to other types of treatment, such as hmmodialysis, in intensive care units.
One would hope that in most fires evacuation on this scale would be unnecessary, but it could happen, for example, that poisonous smoke is pumped in through the air-conditioning system, affecting the whole theatre suite.
Conclusions
(1) Adequate escape routes and equipment must be provided.
(2) All people working in these areas must have a clear idea in advance of the role they must play. They must be familiar with local procedures, escape routes, positions of fire extinguishers, the use of different types of extinguisher, patient evacuation harness and other equipment. They should also be aware of the risks associated with inflammable materials, electrical apparatus, antsthetics and oxygen.
If people determine in advance what they have to do in the event of fire, vital minutes will be saved. Otherwise wrong decisions will be made and lives of patients and staff may be lost. Everyone should imagine the worst possible disaster occurring in his own hospital, and plan the action required.
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